Daily Lessons from St. Thomas

245

Aquinas’s topic: Logic of concepts: how terms signify things

Scripture: “May the spoken words of my mouth, the thoughts of my heart, win favor in your sight, O Lord, my rescuer, my rock.” Psalm 8: 15

Aquinas’s text: Exposition libri peryermenias, bk. 1, lec. 2, n. 2 and 5, written in 1271

Aristotle had begun his book On Interpretation by pointing out that written and spoken terms signify things only through the intermediation of concepts. Br. Thomas considerably expands Aristotle’s brief text, by giving the reasons for his assertions.

Aristotle, On Interpretation 1(1613-7): “Now those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound. And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same; but the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all; and the things of which passions of the soul are likenesses are also the same.”

Br. Thomas’s commentary:

Concerning signification [Aristotle] proposes three points, which imply a fourth. He proposes Awriting,” Avocal sounds,” and Apassions of the soul,” while Athings” are implied, for a passion comes from the impression of an agent and in this way the passions of the soul take their origin from things.

If a human were by nature a solitary animal, the passions of the soul by which he is conformed to things themselves so as to have knowledge of them, might be sufficient for him. But since a human is by nature a political and social animal, it is necessary that the conceptions of one human come to be known by others, which happens through vocal sound. Therefore, it was necessary that there be significant vocal sounds, in order for humans to live together. It follows that those who speak different languages are not able easily to live together.

Also, if a human only had use of sensation, which concerns only what is here and now, it might be sufficient for him to live together with others to have the kind of significant vocal sounds the other animals use to manifest their conceptions to each other through such vocal sounds. But since a human also makes us of intellectual cognition, which abstracts from what is here and now, it follows that he is concerned not just with what is present in time and place but also with things distant in place and future in time. Consequently, in order that a human manifest his conceptions to those who are distant in place and those who will come in future time, it was necessary to make use of writing. . .

When [Aristotle] speaks Aof the passions that are in the soul,” one might think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger or joy or the other passions that are commonly called passions of the soul, as is said at Nicomachean Ethics 2. And it is true that some of the vocal sounds humans make signify by nature passions of this kind, such as the groans of the sick or of other animals, as is said at Politics 1. But the point here is about vocal sounds that signify by human convention. Therefore, Apassions of the soul” here must mean conceptions of the intellect, which names, verbs, and speech signify immediately, according to the teaching of Aristotle. For it is not possible that they immediately signify things themselves, which is clear from their very mode of signifying. For the name Ahuman (homo)” signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars. Consequently, it is not possible that this term immediately signify an individual human. This is why the Platonists held that it signifies the separate idea itself of human. But since this does not really subsist in abstraction according to the teaching of Aristotle, but exists only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify conceptions of the intellect immediately, and then things by their mediation.

Est ergo considerandum quod circa primum tria proponit, ex quorum uno intelligitur quartum. Proponit enim Scripturam, voces et animae passiones, ex quibus intelliguntur res. Nam passio est ex impressione alicuius agentis; et sic passiones animae originem habent ab ipsis rebus. Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal solitarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum notitiam in se haberet; sed quia homo est animal naturaliter politicum et sociale, necesse fuit quod conceptiones unius hominis innotescerent aliis, quod fit per vocem; et ideo necesse fuit esse voces significativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent. Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem. Rursum si homo uteretur sola cognitione sensitiva, quae respicit solum ad hic et nunc, sufficeret sibi ad convivendum aliis vox significativa, sicut et caeteris animalibus, quae per quasdam voces, suas conceptiones invicem sibi manifestant: sed quia homo utitur etiam intellectuali cognitione, quae abstrahit ab hic et nunc; consequitur ipsum sollicitudo non solum de praesentibus secundum locum et tempus, sed etiam de his quae distant loco et futura sunt tempore. Unde ut homo conceptiones suas etiam his qui distant secundum locum et his qui venturi sunt in futuro tempore manifestet, necessarius fuit usus Scripturae

Circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum. Et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voces hominum, ut gemitus infirmorum, et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in I politicae. Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.

[Introductions and translations © R.E. Houser]